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Constitutional Cases 2017: 
An Overview 
Lorne Sossin* 
This contribution reviews the Constitutional Cases issued by the 
Supreme Court in 2017. The analysis is divided into two parts. In the first 
part, I analyze the year as a whole, identifying noteworthy trends.  
In the second part, I explore some specific constitutional decisions of 
the Court — especially those concerning issues which in my view have 
important implications for the future of the Court and its constitutional 
jurisprudence.  
I. 2017: A YEAR IN REVIEW 
2017 might best be described as a year in transition for the Supreme 
Court of Canada. This year represented Chief Justice McLachlin’s last on 
the Court (though cases on which she participated continued to be 
released through June 2018). This year was also Justice Malcolm Rowe’s 
first on the Court. The appointment of Sheilah Martin on November 29, 
2017 to fill one of the “Western Canada” seats on the Court was closely 
watched. While Justice Martin was widely respected as qualified for the 
Court, this appointment was criticized by some as a missed opportunity 
to appoint Canada’s first Indigenous Supreme Court Justice.1  
The appointment of Justice Richard Wagner to assume the role of 
Canada’s new Chief Justice, underscored the transitional feel to 2017. 
Consequently, it was a year of reflection and taking stock of the 
                                                                                                                       
 Dean and Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I am deeply indebted to 
Yadesha Satheaswaran, J.D. 2019 for her superb research and collaboration on the statistical review 
of 2017 for the Constitutional Cases Conference, April 6, 2018. I am grateful to Ben Berger and 
Sonia Lawrence for their assistance on this review and their leadership as conveners of the 
Conference. 
1 See John Geddes, “Indigenous lawyers upset over Trudeau’s Supreme Court pick” 
(November 29, 2017) Macleans at: <https://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/first-nations-lawyers-
upset-over-trudeaus-supreme-court-pick/>.  
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“McLachlin Court”,2 and prognostications about what lies in store with 
the “Wagner Court”, as much as it included a range of important new and 
in some cases contentious Constitutional decisions.  
In total, the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) decided 67 cases during 
this calendar year. Of these 67 SCC cases, I have identified 19 as decisions 
in the constitutional law field,3 including five cases which just affirmed 
Court of Appeal decisions below without adding substantive reasons.4 
This figure takes on significance in light of the steady decline in the 
number of overall judgments from the Court (133 in 1989, the year in 
which Chief Justice McLachlin was appointed to the Court, to 67 during 
her last year on the Court in 2017), and the proportion of judgments 
devoted to constitutional issues correspondingly rising (approximately  
40 per cent in 2017).  
As Canada’s Constitutional jurisprudence matures, the trend towards 
fewer bold, open-ended decisions and more pragmatic, strategic 
decisions appears more pronounced. This trend found expression, for 
example, in a cluster of cases involving Reconciliation and the 
development of Canada’s Constitution in the context of First Nations and 
Indigenous Peoples, in a cluster of cases involving criminal justice 
reforms and in a case involving the scope of constitutional remedies.  
I will discuss these clusters and other trend-setting aspects of the 
Constitutional Cases of 2017 below. 
                                                                                                                       
2 See, for example, Devon Kapoor, “The McLachlin Era: A Retrospective (Parts 1 & 2)” 
TheCourt.ca at: <http://www.thecourt.ca/mclachlin-era-retrospective/>.  
3 R. v. Boutilier, [2017] S.C.J. No. 64, 2017 SCC 64 (S.C.C.); R. v. Jones, [2017] S.C.J. 
No. 60, 2017 SCC 60 (S.C.C.); R. v. Marakah, [2017] S.C.J. No. 59, 2017 SCC 59 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Marakah”]; Assn. of Justice Counsel v. Canada (Attorney General), [2017] S.C.J.  
No. 55, 2017 SCC 55 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Assn. of Justice Counsel”]; Ktunaxa Nation v. British 
Columbia (Forests, Lands and Natural Resource Operations), [2017] S.C.J. No. 54, 2017 SCC 54 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ktunaxa Nation”]; India v. Badesha, [2017] S.C.J. No. 44, 2017 SCC 44 
(S.C.C.); Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v. Enbridge Pipelines Inc., [2017] S.C.J. No. 41, 
2017 SCC 41 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Chippewas of the Thames”]; Clyde River (Hamlet) v. Petroleum 
Geo-Services, [2017] S.C.J. No. 40, 2017 SCC 40 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Clyde River”]; R. v. Cody, 
[2017] S.C.J. No. 31, 2017 SCC 31 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cody”]; R. v. Antic, [2017] S.C.J. No. 27, 
2017 SCC 27 (S.C.C.); R. v. Paterson, [2017] S.C.J. No. 15, 2017 SCC 15 (S.C.C.); B.C. Freedom 
of Information and Privacy Assn. v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2017] S.C.J. No. 6, 2017 
SCC 6 (S.C.C.); Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator, [2017] S.C.J. No. 1, 2017 SCC 1 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Ernst”] and First Nation of Nacho Nyak Dun v. Yukon, [2017] S.C.J. No. 58, 2017 SCC 
58 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Nacho Nyak Dun”]. 
4 R. v. Aitkens, [2017] S.C.J. No. 14, 2017 SCC 14 (S.C.C.); R. v. Clark, [2017] S.C.J.  
No. 3, 2017 SCC 3 (S.C.C.); R. v. Hunt, [2017] S.C.J. No. 25, 2017 SCC 25 (S.C.C.); Re Lajeunesse, 
[2017] S.C.J. No. 24, 2017 SCC 24 (S.C.C.); and R. v. Peers, [2017] S.C.J. No. 13, 2017 SCC 13 
(S.C.C.). 
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Significantly, in her last year on the Court, Chief Justice McLachlin 
authored the most majority decisions (four). Justice Karakatsanis also 
authored or co-authored four majority reasons in 2017, suggesting her 
emergence as a key centrist voice on the Court. Justices Côté and 
Moldaver each authored two dissenting judgments while four justices — 
Abella, Karakatsanis, McLachlin and Brown — authored or co-authored 
one dissenting judgment each. In his last set of majority reasons on the 
Court, Justice Thomas Cromwell (who resigned in 2016), wrote 
controversial majority reasons in Ernst,5 discussed below. Marking his 
first full year on the Court, Justice Rowe was not the sole author of a 
single majority or dissenting opinion (though he did co-author the 
majority decision in Ktunaxa Nation, and penned concurring reasons in 
R. v. Jones and R. v. Marakah,6 each discussed below). 
Against this backdrop of transitions and crossroads for the Supreme 
Court of Canada, I explore some of the most notable cases of 2017.  
II. 2017: THE YEAR, IN CASES 
As noted above, the Supreme Court decided 19 cases featuring the 
Constitution. The most significant activity involved developments under 
sections 2 and 7 of the Charter7 and section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 
1982.8 
The analysis below is divided into three sections. First, I discuss a 
cluster of cases exploring Indigenous rights under the Charter (Ktunaxa 
Nation), and under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (the 
companion cases of Chippewas of the Thames; Clyde River and Nacho 
Nyak Dun).9 Second, I examine two criminal justice cases (R. v. Cody 
and R. v. Marakah),10 which each speak in very different ways to efforts 
to modernize criminal justice in Canada. Third and finally, I offer 
reflections on the puzzle of constitutional remedies to which the Court’s 
muddled reasons in Ernst11 gives rise. 
                                                                                                                       
5 Supra, note 3. 
6 Id. 
7 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
8 Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
9 Supra, note 3. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
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I do not mean to suggest only these 2017 constitutional cases from the 
Supreme Court of Canada merit attention. For many, the Court’s 
examination of section 7 liberty rights in a labour context in Assn. of 
Justice Counsel12 may well be the decision with farthest-reaching 
implications.13 Others will point to the significance of the interplay 
between section 7 rights, extradition and reasonableness review in India 
v. Badesha14 as one of the most noteworthy.15  
While I do not claim the cases discussed below are more deserving of 
scrutiny, below I explore why I believe these three areas of constitutional 
case law in 2017 reflect important trends or dilemmas for the future.  
1. Reconciliation and the Constitution 
In each of the disparate Supreme Court cases involving the Constitution 
and Indigenous Peoples in 2017, the Court links its jurisprudence to the 
overarching goal of Reconciliation. For example, in the opening words of 
Nacho Nyak Dun,16 Karakatsanis J. stated: “As expressions of 
partnership between nations, modern treaties play a critical role in 
fostering reconciliation. Through section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982, they have assumed a vital place in our constitutional fabric.”17  
The Court reiterated a similar normative framework for the duty to 
consult and accommodate in Ktunaxa Nation, Chippewas of the Thames 
and Clyde River.18 That duty, first set out in detail in Haida Nation v. 
British Columbia (Minister of Forests),19 is based on the following 
rationale: 
Put simply, Canada’s Aboriginal peoples were here when Europeans came, 
and were never conquered. Many bands reconciled their claims with the 
sovereignty of the Crown through negotiated treaties. Others, notably in 
British Columbia, have yet to do so. The potential rights embedded in  
these claims are protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.  
                                                                                                                       
12 Id.  
13 See Hamish Stewart, “Assn. of Justice Counsel: The Section 7 Liberty Interest in the 
Context of Employment” (2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) 295. 
14 Id.  
15 For further analysis on this case, see Joanna Harrington, “Extradition, Assurances and 
Human Rights: Guidance from the Supreme Court of Canada in India v. Badesha” (2019) 88 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 273. 
16 Supra, note 3. 
17 Id., at para. 1. 
18 Supra, note 3. 
19 [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, 2004 SCC 73 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haida Nation”]. 
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The honour of the Crown requires that these rights be determined, 
recognized and respected. This, in turn, requires the Crown, acting 
honourably, to participate in processes of negotiation. While this process 
continues, the honour of the Crown may require it to consult and, where 
indicated, accommodate Aboriginal interests.  
… 
The jurisprudence of this Court supports the view that the duty to 
consult and accommodate is part of a process of fair dealing and 
reconciliation that begins with the assertion of sovereignty and 
continues beyond formal claims resolution. Reconciliation is not a final 
legal remedy in the usual sense. Rather, it is a process flowing from 
rights guaranteed by s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. This 
process of reconciliation flows from the Crown’s duty of honourable 
dealing toward Aboriginal peoples, which arises in turn from the 
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over an Aboriginal people and de 
facto control of land and resources that were formerly in the control of 
that people. As stated in Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, 2001 
SCC 33, at para. 9, “[w]ith this assertion [sovereignty] arose an 
obligation to treat aboriginal peoples fairly and honourably, and to 
protect them from exploitation” (emphasis in original).20 
While Reconciliation may well be a “process” and the result of a 
“partnership”, it is a conceptual framework with limits, and in 2017 the 
Supreme Court affirmed the nature and scope of those limits. The thread 
woven into the cluster of cases exploring Reconciliation in 2017 also 
may be seen as one of judicial restraint. The Court is prepared to referee 
Reconciliation procedurally, in other words, but not to intervene in order 
to ensure just outcomes. These cases underscore and reflect the 
procedural ascendancy which has come to characterize the McLachlin 
Court more generally.21 
In Nacho Nyak Dun, mentioned above, the Court considered the 
implications of a modern comprehensive treaty between Yukon and First 
Nations. The Court characterized the case as a judicial review of a land use 
plan developed according to the terms of a treaty, and held that the 
provisions of this treaty required a more collaborative process to the 
management of a watershed than that engaged in by the Yukon Government.  
                                                                                                                       
20 Id., at paras. 25, 32. 
21 See L. Sossin, “The Promise of Procedural Justice” in A. Dodek & D. Wright, eds., The 
McLachlin Court’s First Ten Years: Reflections of the Past and Projections of the Future (Markham, 
ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2010), available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1911499 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1911499>. 
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The dispute grew out of a process to govern the Peel Watershed in 
Yukon. In 2004, the Peel Watershed Planning Commission was 
established to develop a regional land use plan for the Peel Watershed. 
Following an extensive process, the Commission submitted its 
Recommended Peel Watershed Regional Land Use Plan to Yukon and the 
affected First Nations. Near the end of the approval process, and after the 
Commission had released a Final Recommended Plan, Yukon proposed 
and adopted a final plan that made substantial changes to increase access 
to and development of the region. 
Justice Karakatsanis, writing for the Court, noted that in a judicial 
review concerning the implementation of modern treaties, a court should 
focus on the legality of the impugned decision, rather than closely 
supervise the conduct of the parties at each stage of the treaty relationship. 
She observes that, “Reconciliation often demands judicial forbearance”, 
notwithstanding that under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
modern treaties are constitutional documents, and courts must continue to 
perform an important role in safeguarding the rights they enshrine. 
The Court held that while Yukon had the power to make minor 
modifications to land use plans, it did not have the authority to make the 
extensive changes that it made to the Final Recommended Plan for the 
Peel Watershed, and that the trial judge therefore appropriately quashed 
Yukon’s approval of its plan and returned the matter to a stage of further 
consultation. While Yukon was not necessarily constrained in pursuing the 
development projects to which the revised land use plan was directed, it 
had failed to act “honourably” within the requirements of section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 in the process it undertook to finalize this plan. 
Even the procedural obligations of Canadian governments affirmed in 
Nacho Nyak Dun seemed uncertain in the companion cases, Chippewas 
of the Thames and Clyde River.22 Haida and subsequent case law left 
open to what extent and in what contexts Canadian governments could 
delegate the duty to consult and accommodate to regulatory agencies, 
tribunals and other arm’s length executive branch entities.  
In Chippewas of the Thames, the Supreme Court addressed whether 
the regulatory process established by the National Energy Board (NEB) 
in relation to the approval of a pipeline project could satisfy the duty to 
                                                                                                                       
22 Supra, note 3. For further analysis of these cases and their implications, see Kate Glover 
Berger, “Diagnosing Administrative Law: A Comment on Clyde River and Chippewas of the Thames 
First Nation” (2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) 107; and Janna Promislow, “Delegation, Deference and 
Difference: In Search of a Principled Approach to Implementing and Administering Aboriginal 
Rights” (2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) 137. 
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consult and accommodate. The NEB issued notice to Indigenous groups, 
including the Chippewas of the Thames First Nation, informing them of 
the project, the NEB’s role, and the NEB’s upcoming hearing process. 
The Chippewas were granted funding to participate in the process, and 
they filed evidence and delivered oral argument delineating their 
concerns that the project would increase the risk of pipeline ruptures and 
spills, which could adversely impact their use of the land.  
The NEB eventually approved the project, and was satisfied that 
potentially affected Indigenous groups had received adequate information 
and had the opportunity to share their views. The NEB also found that 
potential project impacts on the rights and interests of Aboriginal groups 
would likely be minimal and would be appropriately mitigated.  
Writing for the Court, Karakatsanis and Brown JJ. held that the 
NEB’s process satisfied the duty to consult and accommodate. The Court 
found that as a statutory body with the delegated executive responsibility 
to make a decision that could adversely affect Aboriginal and treaty 
rights, the NEB acted on behalf of the Crown in approving Enbridge’s 
application. Consequently, the Crown, through the NEB, had an 
obligation to consult. The Crown, in discharging its duty, may rely on 
steps taken by an administrative body to fulfil its duty to consult so long 
as the agency possesses the statutory powers to do what the duty to 
consult requires in the particular circumstances. To discharge its 
constitutional duty in this way, it must be made clear to the affected 
Indigenous group that the Crown is relying on this arm’s length body’s 
process, as the Court found was the case in the context of the NEB and 
the Chippewas of the Thames. 
The Court held further held that the duty to consult is not the 
vehicle to address historical grievances. The subject of the 
consultation is the impact on the claimed rights of the current decision 
under consideration. Even taking the strength of the Chippewas’ claim 
and the seriousness of the potential impact on the claimed rights at 
their highest, the consultation undertaken in this case was clearly 
“adequate” in the eyes of the Court. Potentially affected Indigenous 
groups were given early notice of the NEB’s hearing and were invited 
to participate in the process. The Chippewas accepted the invitation 
and appeared before the NEB. They were aware that the NEB was the 
final decision-maker. Moreover, they understood that no other Crown 
entity was involved in the process for the purposes of carrying out 
consultation. The Court concluded that the circumstances of this case 
10 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
made it sufficiently clear to the Chippewas that the NEB process was 
intended to constitute Crown consultation and accommodation.  
In the companion case, Clyde River,23 which involved similar issues 
and a similar process of decision-making through the NEB, the outcome 
was the opposite. The proponents in Clyde River applied to the NEB to 
conduct offshore seismic testing for oil and gas in Nunavut. The 
proposed testing could negatively affect the treaty rights of the Inuit of 
Clyde River, who opposed the seismic testing, alleging that the duty to 
consult had not been fulfilled in relation to it. The NEB granted the 
requested authorization. It concluded that the proponents made sufficient 
efforts to consult with Aboriginal groups and that Aboriginal groups had 
an adequate opportunity to participate in the NEB’s process. The NEB 
also concluded that the testing was unlikely to cause significant adverse 
environmental effects.  
Applying a similar test as Chippewas of the Thames, in this case, the 
Court quashed the decision of the NEB as it failed to meet the standard 
of adequate consultation. Once again writing for the Court, Karakatsanis 
and Brown JJ. found that when affected Indigenous groups have squarely 
raised concerns about Crown consultation with the NEB, the NEB must 
address those concerns in reasons. In this case, the Court found that the 
NEB’s inquiry was misdirected. The NEB considered environmental 
impact of the proposed project, but the consultative inquiry should have 
been on the Indigenous group’s section 35 rights themselves. Here, the 
NEB gave no consideration to the source of the Inuit’s treaty rights, nor 
to the impact of the proposed testing on those rights. Second, although 
the Crown relied on the processes of the NEB as fulfilling its duty to 
consult, that was not made clear to the Inuit. Finally, the NEB made 
available only limited opportunities for participation and consultation by 
Inuit groups (for example, there were no oral hearings and there was no 
participant funding, as in the Chippewas of the Thames).  
While the Court’s decision in Clyde River represented a significant 
victory for the appellants in the case, which should not be minimized, 
this judgment along with the Chippewas of the Thames, arguably 
represents a step backwards (or at least sideways) in the journey toward 
Reconciliation. Emerging from the Crown’s fiduciary obligations and the 
Honour of the Crown, the duty to consult and accommodate was 
elaborated in Haida Nation (and the companion case Taku River Tlingit 
                                                                                                                       
23 Supra, note 3. 
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First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director))24 as a 
hopeful initiative to ensure section 35 rights were top of mind as the 
Crown makes decisions affecting territories subject to Indigenous 
claims.25 In light of these most recent decisions, it appears that the 
Crown need not design processes with Indigenous rights in mind at all — 
rather, as long as existing statutory bodies such as the NEB have 
mandates to consult, and the Crown provides notice to affected 
Indigenous groups that consultations by the arm’s length body will 
constitute the Crown’s consultation, the Crown can rely on such bodies 
to discharge their constitutional duties, even where these bodies do no 
more than permit Indigenous groups to participate on similar terms to all 
other “stakeholders”. In other words, the duty to consult and 
accommodate under section 35 is fast becoming just another version of 
procedural fairness, and the Court seems to have retrenched from the 
initial position expressed by McLachlin C.J.C. in Haida Nation that 
“[t]he honour of the Crown cannot be delegated.”26 
The aspirations of Reconciliation suffered another setback in Ktunaxa 
Nation.27 This decision involved a challenge to a proposed ski resort 
development in the traditional territories of the Ktunaxa First Nation in 
British Columbia (a place known as Qat’muk, which has spiritual 
significance as home to Grizzly Bear Spirit, a principal spirit within 
Ktunaxa religious beliefs and cosmology).  
The Ktunaxa were consulted about this proposed development and 
raised concerns about the impact of the project, which led to some 
modifications to the proposal and additional consultations. After these 
further consultations, the Ktunaxa adopted the position that 
accommodation was impossible because the project would drive Grizzly 
Bear Spirit from Qat’muk and therefore irrevocably impair their religious 
beliefs and practices. The British Columbia Government declared that 
reasonable consultation had occurred and approved the project.  
Writing for a majority of the Court, McLachlin C.J.C. and Rowe J. 
held that the Minister’s decision did not violate the Ktunaxa’s section 
2(a) Charter right to freedom of religion, as their concern was an 
“object” of belief, not the Ktunaxa’s freedom to hold their beliefs or their 
freedom to manifest those beliefs. This aspect of the judgment is 
                                                                                                                       
24 [2004] S.C.J. No. 69, 2004 SCC 74 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Taku River”]. 
25 See, for example, Dwight Newman, The Duty to Consult: New Relationships with 
Aboriginal Peoples (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009). 
26 Haida Nation, supra, note 19, at para. 53. 
27 Supra, note 3.  
12 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
discussed elsewhere in this volume,28 but suffice it to say that the 
juxtaposition between the “freedom” to believe and the “objects” of that 
belief flows from an expressly non-Indigenous approach to spirituality, 
as opposed to an approach attempting to “reconcile” Western and 
Indigenous spiritual approaches or between Western and Indigenous law. 
Beyond the religious freedom aspect of the decision, the Court also 
considered the Minister’s decision that the Crown had met its duty to 
consult and accommodate under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
The Court noted that the Minister’s decision to approve a project for 
development is entitled to deference. A court reviewing an administrative 
decision under section 35 does not decide the constitutional issue de novo 
raised in isolation on a standard of correctness, and therefore does not 
decide the issue for itself.29 Rather, in a blend of administrative law and 
constitutional law standards, the court must ask whether the decision-
maker’s finding on the issue (that is, that the Crown’s duty to consult and 
accommodate was met in these circumstances) was reasonable. 
Framed in this way, the Court need only conclude that the Minister’s 
determination that the consultation and accommodation was adequate 
represented one of the possible findings which could be made in these 
circumstances, not that it was the correct or appropriate finding. The Court 
further noted that Aboriginal rights must be proven by “tested evidence”; 
they cannot be established as an incident of administrative law proceedings 
that centre on the adequacy of consultation and accommodation. In other 
words, the subject matter of this was whether the consultations were 
adequate, not whether the impact on the affected Indigenous community 
justified objecting to the project. For McLachlin C.J.C. and Rowe J., 
“consultation and accommodation” will not resolve underlying claims, but 
rather constitute the best available legal tool. They observe: 
The Ktunaxa reply that they must have relief now, for if development 
proceeds Grizzly Bear Spirit will flee Qat’muk long before they are 
able to prove their claim or establish it under the B.C. treaty process. 
We are not insensible to this point. But the solution is not for courts to 
make far-reaching constitutional declarations in the course of judicial 
review proceedings incidental to, and ill-equipped to determine, 
Aboriginal rights and title claims. Injunctive relief to delay the project 
may be available. Otherwise, the best that can be achieved in the  
 
                                                                                                                       
28 See Howard Kislowicz & Senwung Luk, “Recontextualizing Ktunaxa Nation v. British 
Columbia: Crown Land, History and Indigenous Religious Freedom” (2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) 205. 
29 Ktunaxa Nation, supra, note 3, at para. 82. 
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uncertain interim while claims are resolved is to follow a fair and 
respectful process and work in good faith toward reconciliation. Claims 
should be identified early in the process and defined as clearly as 
possible. In most cases, this will lead to agreement and reconciliation. 
Where it does not, mitigating potential adverse impacts on the asserted 
right ultimately requires resolving questions about the existence and 
scope of unsettled claims as expeditiously as possible. For the Ktunaxa, 
this may seem unsatisfactory, indeed tragic. But in the difficult period 
between claim assertion and claim resolution, consultation and 
accommodation, imperfect as they may be, are the best available legal 
tools in the reconciliation basket.30  
Thus framed, the Court held that the record in Ktunaxa Nation 
supported the reasonableness of the Minister’s conclusion that the section 
35 obligation of consultation and accommodation had been met.  
Ktunaxa Nation reveals the limits of a framework of consultation and 
accommodation. Ultimately, where a First Nation or Indigenous 
community is simply opposed to a project, as here, the framework tends 
to favour the Crown as long as it demonstrates that it appreciates the 
objections and makes some modifications to the project in light of the 
objection. The Court concluded in this context, for example, that while 
the Minister did not offer the ultimate accommodation demanded by the 
Ktunaxa — complete rejection of the ski resort project — the Crown met 
its obligation to consult and accommodate by modifying the proposal. As 
the Court expressly notes, section 35 guarantees a process, not a 
particular result or a veto, and that where adequate consultation has 
occurred, a development may proceed without consent. 
The dissonance between the duty to consult and accommodate 
framework as articulated in Ktunaxa Nation and the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”),31 and its 
emphasis on “free, prior and informed” consent by Indigenous Peoples 
with respect to use of their territory, is striking.  
The increasingly procedural approach to section 35 in the cases 
discussed above, also shows the conceptual and practical limits of the 
Court’s embrace of Reconciliation. In the view of the Supreme Court,  
the goal of Reconciliation remains how to address “Aboriginal rights” in 
the context of Canadian law and Crown sovereignty. In the eyes of many 
First Nations and Indigenous Peoples, however, Reconciliation must in 
                                                                                                                       
30 Id., at para. 86. 
31 A/RES/61/295(September 13, 2007), online: <https://www.un.org/development/desa/ 
indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-the-rights-of-indigenous-peoples.html>.  
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the end address Indigenous laws and sovereignty as well. It remains 
unclear whether the section 35 jurisprudence of the Supreme Court (or 
whether the Supreme Court as an institution itself rooted in Canadian 
claims to sovereignty) is up to the challenge of Reconciliation conceived 
in this way.32  
Just as the Court has confronted the crossroads of Reconciliation, it 
also found itself grappling with transformational change in the criminal 
justice system as well. It is to that sphere that my analysis now turns. 
2. Criminal Justice Reform and Frameworks for the Future 
The future of Canada’s criminal justice system remained very much a 
theme in the Supreme Court in 2017, particularly in R. v. Marakah and R. 
v. Cody.33 These cases engage with the future in very different contexts. 
In Marakah,34 the Court considered the narrow question of whether 
text messages are subject to privacy rights in relation to section 8 of the 
Charter and the protection against unreasonable search and seizure.35 
More broadly, the Court in this case continued its consideration of how 
criminal law and constitutional principles might adapt to the digital age. 
Marakah addressed the issue of whether text messages received on one 
phone could be used against the sender of the texts on another phone. 
The Court held that text messages sent and received may attract a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore can be protected against 
unreasonable search or seizure under section 8 of the Charter. Whether a 
claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the context of a 
particular text message must be assessed in the totality of the 
circumstances. To claim section 8 protection, claimants must establish 
that they had an objectively reasonable, subjective expectation of 
privacy in the messages at issue. The Court identified a number of 
factors that may be considered in this analysis, including: (1) the place 
where the search occurred whether it be a real physical place or a 
metaphorical chat room; (2) the private nature of the subject matter, that 
                                                                                                                       
32 Increasingly, First Nations and Indigenous communities in Canada are turning to 
international law, and a tribunal based on UNDRIP and international law principles, as an alternative 
to the Supreme Court of Canada for addressing disputes. See, for example, “determiNATION: 
Interim Report” (May 2018) at <https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/21632b_3aa3eac61b8346ae9e 
862624f6e9ea99.pdf>.  
33 Supra, note 3. 
34 Supra, note 3. 
35 For additional detail on the implications of this case for s. 8 jurisprudence, see Gerald 
Chan, “Text Message Privacy: Who Else Is Reading This?” (2019) 88 S.C.L.R. (2d) 69. 
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is whether the informational content of the electronic conversation 
revealed details of the claimant’s lifestyle or information of a biographic 
nature; and (3) control over the subject matter. 
In this case, applying this existing framework, the Court held that 
Marakah had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text messages 
recovered from the iPhone of his accomplice “W”, the recipient of the 
messages (the same messages obtained from Marakah’s phone were 
deemed inadmissible based on an invalid search). In the Court’s view, 
Marakah’s subjective expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable. 
Each of the three factors relevant to objective reasonableness in this case 
support this conclusion. If the place of the search is viewed as a private 
electronic space accessible by only Marakah and his accomplice, 
Marakah’s reasonable expectation of privacy is clear.  
It is clear that much of the Court’s analysis of the Charter turns on its 
understanding of the technology and social context involved in text 
messaging. In the course of her analysis, the Chief Justice attempts to set 
out the “technical reality of text messaging”: 
Correctly characterized, the subject matter of the search was  
Mr. Marakah’s “electronic conversation” with Mr. Winchester: see R. v. 
TELUS Communications Co., 2013 SCC 16, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 5, 
per Abella J. To describe text messages as part of an electronic 
conversation is to take a holistic view of the subject matter of the search. 
This properly avoids a mechanical approach that defines the subject matter 
in terms of physical acts, spaces, or modalities of transmission: see 
Spencer, at paras. 26 and 31. It also reflects the technological reality of text 
messaging. 
“Text messaging” refers to the electronic communications medium 
technically known as Short Message Service (“SMS”). SMS uses 
standardized communication protocols and mobile telephone service 
networks to transmit short text messages from one mobile phone to 
another: TELUS, at para. 111, per Cromwell J., dissenting but not on 
this point. Colloquially, however, “text messaging” (or the verb “to 
text”) can also describe various other person-to-person electronic 
communications tools, such as Apple iMessage, Google Hangouts, and 
BlackBerry Messenger. These means of nearly instant communication 
are both technologically distinct from and functionally equivalent to 
SMS. Different service providers also handle SMS messages 
differently. The data that constitute individual SMS or other text 
messages may exist in different places at different times. They may be 
transmitted, stored, and accessed in different ways. But the  
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interconnected system in which they all participate functions to permit 
rapid communication of short messages between individuals. In these 
reasons, I use “text messages” to refer to the broader category of 
electronic communications media, and “SMS” or “SMS messages” to 
refer to that medium specifically.36 
Chief Justice McLachlin quotes approvingly from Abella J.’s caution 
in TELUS that, “[t]echnical differences inherent in new technology 
should not determine the scope of protection afforded to private 
communications.”37 For McLachlin C.J.C., the takeaway is that the 
subject matter of the search is the conversation, “not its components”.38 
Because, for the majority, the section 8 Charter right shifts with the 
subjective expectations of the individual, it will evolve along with the 
digital transformation in our society, in which that subjective experience 
may be harder and harder to disentangle from machine learning, artificial 
intelligence and “augmented reality”. With each new technological leap, 
the social implications for our understanding of “privacy” are profound. 
Indeed, the Chief Justice explores the social context of this mode of 
communication in vivid detail: 
One can even text privately in plain sight. A wife has no way of 
knowing that, when her husband appears to be catching up on emails, 
he is in fact conversing by text message with a paramour. A father does 
not know whom or what his daughter is texting at the dinner table. 
Electronic conversations can allow people to communicate details 
about their activities, their relationships, and even their identities that 
they would never reveal to the world at large, and to enjoy portable 
privacy in doing so.39 
In these circumstances, McLachlin C.J.C. reasoned that if the place of 
the search is viewed as Marakah’s accomplice’s phone, this reduces, but 
does not negate Marakah’s expectation of privacy over texts he sent to 
his accomplice. The mere fact of the electronic conversation between the 
two men tended to reveal personal information about the criminal 
enterprise in which they were participating (an illegal transaction of 
firearms). In addition, Marakah exercised control over the informational 
content of the electronic conversation, which is not negated by the reality  
 
                                                                                                                       
36 Marakah, supra, note 3, at paras. 17-18. 
37 R. v. TELUS Communications Co., [2013] S.C.J. No. 16, 2013 SCC 16, at para. 5 (S.C.C.). 
38 Marakah, supra, note 3, at para. 19. 
39 Id., at para. 36. 
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that the accomplice could have revealed the contents of the text of his 
own accord had he chosen to do so. Therefore, in the majority’s view, 
Marakah had standing to challenge the search and the admission of the 
evidence of the text messages recovered from the accomplice’s iPhone. 
Chief Justice McLachlin concludes that there is nothing in the record to 
suggest that the justice system cannot adapt to the challenges of 
recognizing that some electronic conversations may engage section 8 of 
the Charter. Without the erroneously admitted evidence obtained from his 
accomplice’s iPhone, the majority accepted that Marakah would have 
been acquitted and that to allow that conviction to stand would be a 
miscarriage of justice.  
Justice Moldaver issued a strong dissenting view in Marakah, joined 
by Côté J., asserting that Marakah lacked a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the text message on the phone of his accomplice. Further 
Moldaver J. expressed the concern that the majority’s approach would 
dramatically expand the scope of section 8 Charter coverage.  
Justice Rowe, in one of his first interventions, offered a concurring 
judgment focusing more specifically on the implications of technological 
change to constitutional standards. He noted that the speed at which 
digital communications such as texting may be shared make it 
fundamentally different than physical letters, to which it is often 
analogized in the courts. 
The Supreme Court majority’s holding in Marakah did not signal a 
fundamental shift in section 8 of the Charter in light of digital 
transformations, but we may well look back at how the Court wrestled 
with text messaging as a shot across the bow. The question this case 
raises is whether our existing frameworks for Charter protections in the 
criminal justice system are sufficiently flexible and adaptable to keep up 
with new digital forms of communication and interaction, or whether 
new frameworks are needed. Already, lower courts in the United States 
are grappling with expectations of privacy over communications with or 
facilitated by artificial intelligence, such as Amazon’s “Echo” product.40 
For now, the majority of the Court, led by the departing Chief Justice, 
have doubled down on reliance on the elasticity of the frameworks we 
                                                                                                                       
40 See Nicole Chavez, “Arkansas Judge Drops Murder Charge in Amazon Echo Case” CNN 
(December 2, 2017), at: <https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/30/us/amazon-echo-arkansas-murder-case-
dismissed/index.html>. 
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have. At some point soon, however, those frameworks themselves may 
need to be revisited.41 
An example of where the Court has opted for a new framework to 
confront future challenges is R. v. Cody,42 a follow-up judgment to its 
landmark decision in R. v. Jordan43 establishing new guidelines for 
managing delay and a new test for applying the section 11(d) Charter 
right to trial within a reasonable period in the criminal justice system. 
Cody involved a criminal prosecution for drugs and weapons offences 
commenced in January 12, 2010, where the trial was scheduled to 
conclude on January 30, 2015. Before the commencement of his trial, 
Cody brought an application under section 11(b) of the Charter, seeking a 
stay of proceedings due to the delay, and while this pre-dated the new 
framework developed by the Court in Jordan, the Court of Appeal 
remitted the matter for trial after an application of the Jordan framework, 
and so Cody represented the first opportunity for the Court to reflect on 
the application of Jordan.  
Contrary to the Court of Appeal, in Cody, the Supreme Court, writing 
per curiam (signalling its unity and commitment), concluded that the 
five-year delay in Cody was unreasonable within the Jordan framework. 
More broadly, the Court signalled that the significant disruptions across 
the country (stays of criminal proceedings, policy initiatives to restrict 
preliminary inquiries and other contentious reforms) would not deter or 
distract the Court from its commitment to reform to reduce delay in the 
criminal justice system. 
The Jordan framework establishes presumptive constitutional ceilings 
for the time a criminal prosecution may take — 18 months for cases tried 
in provincial courts and 30 months for cases tried in superior courts.44 
Under the Jordan framework, after the total delay from the charge to the 
actual or anticipated end of trial is calculated, delay attributable to the 
defence is subtracted. That defence delay is further divided into two 
components: delay waived by the defence and delay caused by defence 
conduct, and these delays “count” against the total period of the delay.  
 
                                                                                                                       
41 See, for example, the examination of the impact of new robotic technology on privacy 
expectations in Ian R. Kerr, “Schrödinger’s Robot: Privacy in Uncertain States” (April 12, 2018) 20 
Theoretical Inquires L. (2019 Forthcoming); Ottawa Faculty of Law Working Paper No. 2018-14. 
Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3158790>.  
42 Supra, note 3. 
43 [2016] S.C.J. No. 27, 2016 SCC 27 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Jordan”]. 
44 Id., at para. 46. 
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And, to determine this amount, the Court must also consider delay solely 
or directly caused by the accused person which flows from defence 
action that is illegitimate. Illegitimacy in this sense relates not to ethical 
misconduct (necessarily) but rather in the sense of the “culture change” 
to which the Jordan framework was aimed. The Court acknowledges in 
Cody that defence conduct encompasses both substance and procedure, 
and both may attract scrutiny.  
The Court stressed that beyond a retrospective accounting of delay, a 
proactive approach is required from all participants in the justice system 
to prevent and minimize delay. Trial judges should suggest ways to 
improve efficiency, use their case management powers and not hesitate to 
summarily dismiss applications and requests the moment it becomes 
apparent they are frivolous. 
The Court in Cody affirmed that after defence delay has been 
deducted, the net delay must be compared to the applicable 
presumptive ceiling set out in Jordan. Transitional considerations may 
be taken into account as a form of exceptional circumstances where, as 
here, the case was already in the system when Jordan was decided. The 
Court notes that in Cody, the total delay was approximately 60.5 
months, from which the delay waived by C should be deducted (13 
months). After accounting for the other defence related delays, the total 
delay is 44 months, which far exceeds the 30-month ceiling set out in 
Jordan and therefore, was presumptively unreasonable, and Cody was 
entitled to the stay he sought. 
Marakah and Cody involve different criminal justice issues, 
different Charter rights, and different facts and circumstances. Each 
highlights a distinct approach as to how the Supreme Court envisions 
the evolution of the criminal justice system. In Marakah, the majority 
of the Court kept adapted frameworks to the dynamics of new 
technology in the determination of an accused’s expectation of privacy 
for purposes of section 8 of the Charter. In Cody, the Court confirmed 
its new framework for determining delay under section 11(d) of the 
Charter. In both cases, the Court assumed its own leadership with 
respect to how criminal justice would confront the future. In civil 
contexts, however, the Court has taken a notably different approach to 
the evolution of constitutional norms, one apparently premised on 
deference to legislative choices. I discuss this dynamic below in 
context of Charter damages, to which I now turn. 
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3. Statutory Bars to Constitutional Remedies: The Importance of 
Being Ernst  
In Ernst,45 the Supreme Court of Canada considered the availability of 
Charter damages in the face of a statutory bar to civil litigation against a 
public regulator. In this third area of focus among the constitutional cases of 
2017, I consider the Court’s rationale in Ernst for upholding this statutory 
bar and the implications of the Court’s analysis for a coherent relationship 
between statutory and constitutional interpretation in Canada.46 
The case arose in the context of a property owner, Jessica Ernst, who 
was seeking various remedies against private and public parties she 
believed to be responsible for harm to her property as a result of fracking 
activities. One of the defendants in her claim was the Alberta Energy 
Regulator (“AER”), a statutory, quasi-independent energy regulator. 
Among other grounds for relief, Ernst alleged she was “punished” by the 
AER for publicly criticizing it and that she was prevented by the AER 
from speaking out for a period of 16 months. Ernst claimed that her 
section 2(b) Charter right to freedom of expression was breached, and 
that Charter damages should be available to remedy that breach. As this 
case arises from a motion to strike her claim based on pleadings, all the 
facts alleged by Ernst had to be accepted by the court as true. 
Section 43 of the Energy Resources Conservation Act (the “Act”),47 
the statute that governs the AER, immunizes it from civil claims for 
actions it takes pursuant to its statutory authority. Both the Alberta Court 
of Queen’s Bench and the Alberta Court of Appeal found that the 
immunity clause on its face bars Ernst’s claim for Charter damages and 
concluded therefore that her claim against the Board should be struck 
out. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, for the first time, she 
added to her claim a challenge to the constitutional validity of section 43 
of the Act. The immunity clause at issue reads: 
No action or proceeding may be brought against the Board or a member 
of the Board or a person referred to in section 10 or 17(1) in respect of 
any act or thing done purportedly in pursuance of this Act, or any Act 
                                                                                                                       
45 Supra, note 3. 
46 This analysis builds on Lorne Sossin, “Damaging the Charter: Ernst v. Alberta Energy 
Regulator” (January 20, 2017) The Court.ca, online: <http://www.thecourt.ca/damaging-charter-
ernst-v-alberta/>. 
47 R.S.A. 2000, c. E-10. 
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that the Board administers, the regulations under any of those Acts or a 
decision, order or direction of the Board.48 
The majority judgment (authored by Cromwell J. in one of his final 
judgments), concludes that since Ernst herself acknowledged the 
statutory bar precluded her claim for Charter damages (and therefore 
should be struck down), and no authorities were offered in support of the 
view that the statutory bar did not preclude that claim, then the Supreme 
Court of Canada had to proceed on that basis. Justice Cromwell 
separately concluded that even if a Charter damages claim were 
permitted, however, such a claim would fail in these circumstances 
because of the countervailing factors against the awarding of Charter 
damages as recognized in Vancouver (City) v. Ward.49 
In Ward, the Court set out a framework for the Charter damages 
claims under section 24(1), under which the claimant must demonstrate 
that her or his Charter rights had been breached and that damages would 
serve as compensation, vindication, or deterrence. Once that burden is 
met, the state has the onus to demonstrate that damages should not be 
awarded based on countervailing considerations (such as the availability 
of alternative remedies and good governance arguments). 
The majority’s view that it must accept the statutory bar precluding a 
claim to Charter damages because the claimant seems to accept this 
premise unduly fetters the discretion of the Court. If the proper 
understanding of a Charter doctrine has not been advanced by the parties, 
this does not mean the Court must accept an improper understanding, as 
the Court itself has acknowledged in the past.50 It is always open to the 
Court to reach a conclusion on a question of constitutional interpretation 
even if it differs from the position advanced by the parties or where the 
parties have chosen for their own reasons not to advance that argument. 
For reasons set out below, in my view, the premise the Supreme Court of 
Canada accepts in Ernst, that a statutory immunity clause can in any 
circumstances bar a Charter claim, is suspect. 
The majority’s discussion of countervailing factors is also 
unpersuasive. The existence of countervailing factors, as set out above, 
only arises where a party’s entitlement to Charter damages has been 
                                                                                                                       
48 Id., s. 43.  
49 [2010] S.C.J. No. 27, 2010 SCC 27 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ward”]. 
50 See, for example, Eaton v. Brant County Board of Education, [1996] S.C.J. No. 96, 
[1997] 1 S.C.R. 241, at para. 55 (S.C.C.), where Sopinka J., writing for the Court on this point, 
indicates the key issue is whether appropriate notice of the relevant constitutional questions have 
been provided — so, for example, an Attorney General could intervene to provide submissions. 
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established and where the Crown seeks to demonstrate that damages 
nonetheless should not be awarded. 
First, a preliminary motion to strike Ernst’s claim against the AER 
because of the statutory bar to Charter damages should not depend on 
whether she has a strong or weak case to actually establish her 
entitlement to damages, nor on whether the Crown has or does not have 
grounds to raise countervailing factors. In other words, either her Charter 
claim is barred (in which case the analysis of countervailing factors is 
irrelevant), or it is not barred (in which case the analysis of 
countervailing factors is premature). 
Second, the existence of countervailing factors in this case is not 
compelling. The majority asserts that because judicial review is available 
on administrative law grounds, this alternative remedy militates against 
the availability of Charter damages. The effect of the majority finding is 
that while a common law remedy (judicial review) cannot be barred by 
statute, a constitutional remedy (Charter damages) can be. This finding is 
puzzling. Statutes always must be interpreted in ways that safeguard, not 
inhibit, the protection of Charter rights and freedoms. 
The countervailing good governance concerns also fall flat. Justice 
Cromwell notes that the Board must be free from the anxiety of constant 
litigation in pursuing its statutory goals. While this might be relevant 
where a claim relates to someone aggrieved by the regulatory actions of a 
regulator, Ernst involves a regulator engaging in alleged punitive 
behaviour in an attempt to silence a complainant. A suit for Charter 
damages is not the same as a suit for civil damages, and the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s desire to frame the former as a species of the latter 
(rather than as part of the spectrum of remedies for Charter breaches per 
se) leads the majority of the Court, in my view, down a problematic path. 
In reaching this conclusion, the majority relies on cases involving the 
high bar for negligence claims against public regulators — Cromwell J. 
observes, “[w]hile, as noted, Charter damages are an autonomous 
remedy, and every state actor has an obligation to be Charter-compliant, 
the same policy considerations as are present in the law of negligence 
nonetheless weigh heavily here .…”51  
The second point in this passage simply does not follow from the 
first. If Charter damages represent an autonomous remedy, and if every 
state actor has an obligation to be Charter-compliant, then the case law 
relating to negligence against state agencies sheds little if any light on the 
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issue (just as the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, in Henry v. 
British Columbia (Attorney General),52 held that the tort of malicious 
prosecution did not shed light on the test appropriate for Charter 
damages claims against Crown prosecutors). The search for remedies 
that are “just and appropriate” under section 24 of the Charter is 
fundamentally distinct from the search for a duty of care and breach 
under the common law tort of negligence. 
The dissenting group of four justices, led by McLachlin C.J.C. and 
Moldaver and Brown JJ. (Côté J. concurring), conclude that Ernst’s 
claim should not be struck, as it was not plain and obvious that Charter 
damages could in no circumstances be an appropriate and just remedy in 
a claim against the Board. Further, they concluded it is not plain and 
obvious that Ernst’s claim is barred by section 43. The dissenting justices 
come to a more sound conclusion, but their reasoning is also based on a 
faulty premise. They stated: 
In deciding whether a claim for Charter damages should be struck out 
on the basis of a statutory immunity clause, the court must first 
determine whether it is plain and obvious that Charter damages could 
not be an appropriate and just remedy in the circumstances of the 
plaintiff’s claim.53 
By suggesting that the merits of the Charter damages have to be 
assessed before considering the scope of the statutory immunity clause, 
the dissenting justices, like the majority, seem to put the statutory cart 
before the constitutional horse. It is entirely possible that Charter 
damages are not warranted in the circumstances of this case (though it is 
uncertain on what grounds the Court could reach such a determination 
while also accepting all the facts as pleaded by the claimant as true), but 
that analysis has little to do with whether a statutory bar can preclude a 
section 24 Charter remedy. The issue in the appeal to the Supreme Court 
of Canada was the scope of the statutory immunity clause, not the 
strength of the claim to Charter damages. 
In my view, the answer to the question regarding the statutory 
immunity clause raised in this case is far simpler than the approach taken 
by the majority or dissenting justices. An immunity clause can preclude 
only those claims that a legislature has the constitutional authority to bar 
— that includes civil claims for damages, but it cannot bar Charter 
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claims (including Charter claims, as in Ernst, where one of the remedies 
sought is Charter damages). On this reading, the Supreme Court of 
Canada could and should have interpreted the statutory bar as 
inapplicable to this claim to the extent a breach of the Charter is properly 
pleaded. Further, to Abella J.’s objection in her concurring reasons, the 
Alberta Government would not need to have received formal notice of 
the claim, since the validity of the statutory immunity clause does not 
arise as a live issue if it is interpreted as inapplicable to Charter claims. 
Returning to my broader objection with the majority of the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s approach to Charter damages, the claim in this case, 
on its face, is that a Charter breach has occurred. Ernst claims she was 
silenced as punishment for her opposition to the Board. The availability 
of Charter damages, like the availability of other Charter remedies 
(declarations, injunctions, etc.), cannot be precluded by an act either of a 
provincial legislature or of Parliament (unless the notwithstanding clause 
under section 33 is invoked, which is the sole mechanism for 
immunizing public bodies from Charter scrutiny, and therefore, from 
Charter remedies). Legislation can limit the availability of Charter 
remedies from administrative tribunals and regulators as they have no 
inherent powers, and so can only provide those constitutional remedies 
which fall within their statutory jurisdiction,54 but here, the remedy 
sought is from a court. 
In my view, the Court in Ernst misconstrues the place of Charter 
damages in the context of Canada’s constitutional architecture. It is 
important to recall what is at issue in Ernst. The case is not about 
whether the Charter was breached, or, if so, whether Charter damages are 
appropriate — rather, this case is about whether a claimant should have a 
chance to prove her allegations of a Charter breach warranting damages 
as a remedy, and whether a statute can bar her from having such an 
opportunity. By upholding the validity of a statute to bar a Charter 
remedy, the Supreme Court of Canada has allowed a legislature to 
unilaterally circumscribe constitutional protections and done so for no 
broader constitutional rationales or benefits. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The constitutional cases of 2017 may well be overshadowed by the 
significant transitions which occurred during this eventful year, and in 
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particular, the retirement of Chief Justice McLachlin. She will, I think, be 
remembered for her remarkable energy and productivity, her gift for 
consensus-building on the Court, her courage in the face of the criticism 
from Prime Minister Harper in 2014 as part of the fallout from the 
invalidated appointment of Justice Marc Nadon, and her growing 
commitment, particularly as Chief Justice, to the field of Reconciliation 
with First Nation and Indigenous Peoples.  
That said, the Supreme Court’s constitutional cases of 2017 merit 
scrutiny for several reasons. As set out in the analysis above, I believe 
this year will be seen as a setback in the journey toward Reconciliation, 
on the basis of Chippewas of the Thames, Clyde River and Ktunaxa 
Nation. I believe this year highlights the tensions in the Court’s role in 
criminal justice reform between adapting existing frameworks to meet 
future challenges, such as the digital transformation touched upon in 
Marakah, or developing new frameworks, such the Jordan framework, 
applied to the administrative and advocacy hurdles to reduce delay in 
Cody. Finally, I believe Ernst will be remembered as a problematic 
precedent in working out the relationship between statutory interpretation 
on the one hand, and the requirements of the Constitution on the other. 
For all of these reasons, in the context of the Supreme Court of 
Canada and the Constitution, 2017 was a year to remember! 
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